Drawing inspiration from Ross Emmett's (2006) Lovejoy (1936) might have thought about the origin of public choice. He would surely have denied that public choice denoted a "unit idea." Public choice is a generic term, like Enlightenment, Romanticism, and similar terms that cover many different and often inconsistent ideas. In its generic form, public choice descends from the neoclassical focus on rational action applied to voting. While the scholars associated with Virginia political economy likewise displayed an interest in rationality and voting, their core ideas descended from the confluence between the classical tradition of political economy and the Italian tradition of public finance. The significance of origins resides in the orientation it provides for future scholarship. An analytical core drawn from a neoclassical theory of rationality and voting based on demonstrative reasoning reflects a different analytical vision than does a classical theory of creative action and societal organization based on plausible reasoning. This latter location of origin points toward an integrated treatment of the economic, political, and social aspects of the perennial problem of people living together in close geographical proximity where cooperation and antagonism are both always in play.
Constructing scholarly genealogy entails significant subjective elements that are absent from biological genealogy. At any moment, a scholar stands inside a chain of being (Lovejoy 1936) , where one end points backward to some sense of origin while the other end points forward to work that remains to be done. The construction of such chains belongs not to the realm of necessity but to the realm of volition, out of recognition of the ability of language to encapsulate sentiment and emotion and not to serve simply as an instrument for conveying fact, as Viktor Klemperer (2006) illustrates beautifully in his examination of the use of language in Nazi Germany. Alternative narratives regarding origins point toward different directions for future scholarship as part of the highly contested quality of scholarly activity, as Melvin Reder (1999) explores for economics in particular and Randall Collins (1998) examines for scholarly competition in general. In presenting my thesis, I open with Kenneth Boulding's (1971) treatment of past thought as belonging to what he called the "extended present." After this, I explore some problems of understanding past scholarship when the tools of thought in play between then and now have changed, and when scholarly contestation at any moment often yields work with a mixed-metaphor quality because the existing tools of thought are not fully suitable for illuminating the intuitions behind that thought. This is the problem of index numbers as applied to the growth of scholarly understanding.
In particular, I explore the problem of appraising the contribution of the The Calculus of Consent. This book is universally cited as one of the half-dozen or so canonical works of public choice, and is undoubtedly the Ur-text of Virginia political economy. That book reflects in spades the problems I have just mentioned. It was constructed using mostly simple neoclassical tools of thought that were in wide use at the time. Among other things, this generated a focus on representative agents and median voters. Yet the intuition behind the book was to use economic logic to make sense of the complex construction of the American constitutional system of 1789, where power was divided in numerous ways and not concentrated in some image of a median voter. All scholars have the problem of making themselves understood in light of the tools of thought that are in play among their cohorts. Below, I explain that The Calculus of Consent and the vision of public choice it enables is best understood as a confluence of the liberal political economy of classical times (Robbins 1952 , Samuels 1966 ) and the public finance orientation of the classical Italian theorists (De Viti de Marco 1888).
1 In saying this, I don't deny sensibility to the standard reading, but rather assert that the alternative reading is more consistent with the authors' intuitions and their later bodies of work, including a predilection for the classical use of plausible reasoning over the neoclassical predilection for demonstrative reasoning, which Polya (1954) explains and which Wagner (2015a) illustrates with respect to welfare economics..
Past Economics as Economics of the Extended Present
Economists are notorious for having disdain for old books. Few doctoral programs offer fields in the history of economic analysis and many of them don't even offer courses on the topic. Many reading lists feature few items more than five years old, and with many of the featured items having yet to be published. The image created by such reading lists is that past scholarship has little to offer present scholars. This image reflects what appears to be the widely-held presumption that whatever was once valuable in the past has already been incorporated into present economic theory, so avoiding old books avoids wasting time in exploring blind alleys, which in turn makes economic theory more progressive than it would otherwise be. We can honor the past by recognizing that we are standing on the shoulders of giants, but there is no need to read the contributions of those giants because those of their formulations that are still useful are already incorporated into current theory.
This widely held belief is just that, a belief or an article of faith. It has neither theory nor evidence in its support. Indeed, as theory it entails a thoroughgoing embrace of the theory of perfect competition applied to the present state of economic scholarship, along with the claim that perfect competition pertains to that generation in each and every instant of time. Yet very few economists believe, and for good reason, that the theory of perfect competition gives a good description of actual economic processes or arrangements. Furthermore, that belief runs afoul of the micro-theoretic basis of the constitution of economic theories, as Arthur Lovejoy (1936: 3-23 ) explains in his treatment of "The Study of the History of Ideas." An economic theory is packaged as a macro-theoretic entity. That entity, however, is constituted as a string of microtheoretic entities. Consider the use by some theorists to explain involuntary unemployment as a consequence of firms paying efficiency wages above the competitive wage. While this idea is packaged as a macro entity, or what Lovejoy described as a "unit-idea," it is actually constituted through stringing together a number of micro bits of theory. Among those bits are assumptions about business firms, agency theory, compensation schemes, marginal productivity theory and its alternatives, and the meaning of competition, among other bits, all of which can be combined in numerous ways. (Schumpeter 1954: 41) which the scholar then seeks to articulate so as to make it intelligible to others. The articulation of that vision will occur through some ordered string of units of thought. How those units are strung together and how they are conceptualized will depend on the tools of thought that an author has available to work with. Vriend (2002) explains that agent-based computational modeling offers a good platform for working with some of Hayek's ideas about knowledge that is fragmented and distributed and nowhere possessed by one person or scholar. Yet such tools of thought weren't available to Hayek, so he had to resort to literary reasoning that was easily reducible to a statement of equilibrium conditions, the incoherence of which was subsequently illustrated by Stiglitz's (1976, 1980) claiming to have explained that Hayek erred when they actually ignored Hayek and did not contest his formulation. Where Hayek reasoned about emergent dynamics over some interval of time using plausible reasoning, Grossman and Stiglitz eliminated action through time by working with comparative statics at some particular instant using demonstrative reasoning. The ability to extract implications from a pre-analytical cognitive vision depends on the tools of thought the author possesses.
Hayek lacked some tools that could have facilitated his construction; Grossman and
Stiglitz worked with tools that denied by assumption Hayek's cognitive vision. The schemes of thought associated with any scholarly tradition that is a progressive research program can be likened to a river into which numerous scholars contribute. With multiple schemes of thought and research programs being in play at any moment, it is not unusual to find admixtures among schemes sometimes occurring due to strategic and competitive elements entailed in the generation of scholarship as scholars compete for attention space (Collins 1998) , and with schools of thought emerging in consequence of that competition. As the Virginia tradition developed over the half-century following publication of The Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) , the mainline currents of its thought became mixed with currents from the mainstream of economic thought (invoking Peter Boettke's (2007) distinction between the mainline and mainstream branches of economic theory).
The constitutional scheme of separated and divided powers meant that the median voter model was more a fictional construction than a reasonable model of a constitutional arrangement. A median voter model might pertain for a five-member town council that has the sole authority to allocate tax revenues among expenditure items. It would not, however, apply to complex arrangements of separated and divided powers where concurrence among different entities is required before collective action can be undertaken. In these kinds of settings, outcomes are products of interaction and negotiation and not products of choice. The American constitutional system created a complex structure of divided and separated powers that required concurrence among different sets of people. Within a bicameral legislature, for instance, the degree of concurrence that is required varies with the principles by which the two chambers are selected. Within the original constitutional setting, the federal Senate was selected by state legislatures while the House was selected directly through election. In consequence of constitutional amendment in 1913, the federal Senate also became selected directly through election. This change surely created more commonality among the electorates than had previously existed. In a two chamber system where both chambers are staffed through at-large elections, selection is likely to operate similarly in both chambers. Quite different properties would result should one chamber be populated, for instance, by property owners and the other by renters, and with legislation requiring concurrence between both chambers. In this respect, one well cited game-theoretic exposition of fair division occurs where one person slices a cake and the other person takes the first slice. This formulation is similar to requiring concurrence between differently constituted chambers.
In any case, the prime purpose of The Calculus of Consent was to explain that the complex system of government that the American Constitution established and which had been under strenuous attack by Progressives at least since when Woodrow
Wilson (1885) wrote Congressional Government, where he extolled the virtues of a strong administrative apparatus in place of continual congressional negotiation. The
Calculus of Consent was conveyed mostly by equilibrium formulations of a relatively simple sort, even though the purpose of the book was to explain how the complex American constitutional system made sense from the perspective of economic logic and even though that sense would vanish if the system were actually reduced to conform to the simplicity of the logic, as Vincent Ostrom (1973 Ostrom ( , 1987 Ostrom ( , 1997 recognized with especial cogency. The Calculus of Consent was penned as an antidote to the call for centralization that the Progressivists had been promoting for around half a century, and to reduce collective action to a choice by a median voter is to embrace the core of Progressivism, as Vincent Ostrom (1997) explained.
The Entangled Quality of Method and Substance
All social theories refer to objects that no one can apprehend directly. No one has ever seen a society, a polity, an economy, or other similar objects to which social theories repeatedly make references. Those objects are creations of prior theoretical construction, and with social theorizing proceeding in the aftermath of that prior construction. Once this situation is recognized, it becomes immediately apparent that there are different ways of constructing the objects that social theories are subsequently employed in examining. The substantive statements that are generated within a social theorist's mind thus depend on the methods he or she uses to construct objects which the theory examines. Method and substance are entangled. This situation poses, in turn, questions regarding the usefulness or helpfulness of different conceptual frameworks to use in apprehending societal reality.
Arthur Lovejoy (1936: 7) Lovejoy's this-worldly scheme of thought fits within the Renaissance canon, which is a non-equilibrium scheme of thought suitable for capturing the turbulence of a crowd of energetic pedestrians pursuing their myriad and distinct plans, and which contrasts with the placidity of a parade.
As Lovejoy explains, alternative unconscious mental habits channel social theory in different directions, each bringing different material into the analytical foreground. The Enlightenment mental habit is the predominant habit within contemporary economics.
This scheme of thought is other-worldly in that it compares an imperfect reality with some vision of perfection, and which in turn often leads to the advancement of suggestions of how power might be used to nudge society closer to some imagined state of perfection. This unconscious mental habit has led to the generation of various schemes of thought that reflect that mental habit. General equilibrium theory, particularly of the stochastic sort, is one such reflection. This scheme of thought sets forth a vision of perfection in conjunction with recognition that reality falls short of perfection and so requires the insertion of power to move society closer to perfection.
The stochastic quality of the theory is necessary to explain why perfection is never attained, meaning that the insertion of power into society will always be warranted.
The non-equilibrium alternative scheme of thought reflects a this-worldly orientation where a directional belief in progress is replaced by a non-directional belief in experimentation and change. Within this mental habit, there is no source for the injection of power into society because power is always resident within society (Weiser 1926; Schmitt 1932) . Hence, polity and economy refer to autonomous features of societal interaction wherein people are continually engaged in activities that are generating the reality they will live with and experience, and with no end in sight for this process. It is worth noting that change is present in either scheme of thought. Within the other-worldly scheme, change is the consequence of those reflexive characters who seek to remove sources of imperfection their theories have identified. In this case, the "their" refers to some intellectual vanguard who must bring society along with their plans and schemes toward greater conformity with some external image, as befits the Progressive vision of political leadership. In contrast, change within a this-worldly scheme is the activity of everyone as they act in their various ways and precincts.
People are naturally curious and inquisitive, some more than others, and they experiment in numerous ways, some small and others large, and all of which generates on-going societal change. Some people might change their patterns of consumption, as in shifting from meat to vegan diets. Other people might develop new products or enterprises. The full range of such change promotes on-going societal evolution in bottom-up fashion. Wagner (2007 Wagner ( , 2016 illustrating some of those differences in direction.
Moving forward by going backward

Public Choice, Economizing Action, and Virginia Political Economy
Individual theorists rarely assign themselves explicitly to a school of thought, for (1960) and Fausto (2003) Pareto and Fasiani (1949) . These kinds of differences aside, the Italian tradition in public finance arose as an effort to incorporate political activity into the explanatory framework of economic theory. Within this tradition, political processes reflected the same principle of economizing action as did market processes, and with differences between market phenomena and fiscal phenomena arising because of differences in the institutional environments that governed interactions among participants. The schemes of thought associated with any scholarly tradition resemble a river into which numerous scholars contribute. With multiple schemes of thought and research programs being in play at any moment, it is not unusual to find admixtures among schemes sometimes occurring due to strategic and competitive elements entailed in the generation of scholarship (Collins 1998) as scholars compete for attention space, sometimes making tactical borrowings from other analytical cores despite inconsistencies between those borrowings and the cores of the parental research programs.
In the following three sections I shall illustrate a few Italianate themes that speak directly to topics that arise almost naturally within the core of Virginia political economy, with the qualifier "almost" denoting that themes never truly arise "naturally" but arise because scholars insert them into the scholarly conversation. In particular, I shall offer some brief illustrations from Attilio da Empoli, Maffeo Pantaleoni, and Vilfredo Pareto.
Attilio da Empoli and Italianate Fiscal Catallactics
Attilio da Empoli was in the process of making significant contributions to the classical Italian tradition of public finance when he died in 1948 at the age of 44. His conceptual orientation, moreover, sought continually to develop means of theorizing in bottom-up fashion. For instance, in his Teoria dell' incidenza delle imposte Da Empoli (1926) set forth the concept of oblique incidence. This concept stands in sharp contrast to the standard dichotomy of forward and backward shifting, and illustrates how Da
Empoli stood apart from the standard neoclassical orientation by thinking in terms of structured patterns of interaction rather than working with the standard dichotomy where those interactions are reduced to a single relationship between consumers and producers. Within the standard dichotomy, taxes are shifted either forward to consumers or backward to producers. In developing his concept of oblique incidence, da Empoli not only sought to develop analyses of types of horizontal shifting but also in so doing thought in terms of a disaggregated network of economic interaction that was ahead of his time because the tools and techniques of network-based theorizing were not in play at that time.
In Chapter 8 (pp. 91-136) of his Lineamenti teorici dell'economia corporativa finanziaria, Da Empoli (1941), building on De Viti, sought to establish a framework for integrating collective action into the economic process. Da Empoli explained that any such effort to incorporate collective action into the economic process must confront two snares that beckon the theorist and which must be avoided if a genuinely explanatory theory is to be developed. One snare is to by-pass the analytical challenge by proceeding without any effort to construct any bridge between the taxing and spending sides of the budget. To treat a tax as an uncaused cause (imposta grandine) is one illustration of this avoidance. Yet taxes are always caused by desires held by someone somewhere in a society that becomes manifested through political action. Those desires, moreover, are not some kind of representative desire but rather are desires that typically vary among people. A related form of this snare is to postulate that collective action is not susceptible to economic explanation. This is the approach Paul Samuelson (1954, 1955) took, and which James Buchanan sought to oppose in setting forth an approach to fiscal catallactics (1967, 1968) . With respect to Buchanan and fiscal catallactics, moreover, Marianne Johnson (2014) explains that from his student years in Chicago Buchanan wanted to do public finance differently from what then passed as public finance. That desire to be different was quickly put on display in Buchanan (1949) .
The other snare is to assume that fiscal processes are just market process by another name or means. It's easy enough to understand the power of this snare to capture a theorist's attention. The image of a parliamentary assembly as a peculiar form of investment bank is one way to avoid both of these snares. This assembly could not be a simple investment bank, for this would be to fuse the taxing and spending sides. Yet it is an arena within which the conflicting desires of people for programs are intermediated. In many respects, a parliament is like a partnership of investment bankers, in that it intermediates between the political enterprises that supply services on one side and the citizens who provide revenues to support those enterprises on the other side, as explained in McCormick and Tollison (1981) and Leibowitz and Tollison (1980) .
As an investment bank, the legislative partners seek to develop connections between people who have enterprises for which they are seeking support and people who have the means available to support political enterprises. To say they have the means of support does not imply that they turn it over voluntarily, for if they did that the polity would be a regular investment bank and not a peculiar investment bank. It is almost surely the case that there is complementarity between decisions about the support of enterprises and the ability of legislatures to generate revenue, which provides a budgetary bridge between the two sides of the fiscal account, provided only that people who are attracted into the legislative form of investment banking prefer to do more business rather than to do less.
A bridge always exists that connects sources of revenue provided by citizens to sources of service provided by political enterprises. To be sure, political enterprises do not operate by the same rules that govern market-based enterprises, but the connection between revenue and service must be there all the same. It would always be possible to make that connection as direct as it is with ordinary commercial transactions. Knut Wicksell's (1896 Wicksell's ( , [1958 ) well-cited formulation articulated one particular approach to doing just this. In Wicksell's formulation, the legislature would serve explicitly as an intermediary to connect those who supply services with those who demand them. The organization of legislatures along non-Wicksellian lines does not deny the connection between service and revenue, but it does render that connection complex and ambiguous, and something to be explored and illuminated. A good deal of that complexity comes about because of the large number of political enterprises that run some of their financing though the legislature, along with the large number of revenue sources that legislatures tap.
As Eusepi and Wagner (2011) explain, a society contains numerous enterprises distributed across public and market squares. Some of those enterprises are supported through a legislative process and so operate with inalienable ownership. These enterprises bear a parasitical relationship to the system of market pricing (Pantaleoni 1911) : they don't generate prices and yet must use prices to guide economic calculation. All of the enterprises are seeking to expand their custom, only with the different forms of enterprise governed by different rules of organization that in turn generate differing patterns of conduct. Zones of conflict and cooperation would arise among different enterprises, and the political arena would expand or contract depending on the particular organizational efficiency this peculiar investment bank is able to attain.
Government would be a factor of production in society, and its operation within society would radiate throughout society in thoroughly oblique and knotted fashion, to recur to Da Empoli's analysis of oblique incidence. Governments would be participants within the complex adaptive system that society represents, not necessarily all to the good by any means but there all the same as societal phenomena to be explained.
Maffeo Pantaleoni and Systems of Political Pricing
Both market and fiscal activities occur within the same society, and the analytical challenge is to create some kind of bridge between the two sets of activities, only to do so without reducing fiscal activity to an instance of market activity. Maffeo Pantaleoni (1911) advanced one such effort to do so. The key feature in Pantaleoni's framework was his recognition that fiscal activities are not financed through direct market transactions. Fiscal activity does not entail customers who pay market prices at the time of particular transactions; political revenue is not generated directly through transactions and with the sum of those transactions generating a public budget. Political revenues are generated through taxes which are parasitical attachments to market transactions.
The particular type of parasitical relationship varies with the form of tax, but political revenues are generated through parasitical attachment to market transactions in any case.
With respect to Figure 1 , Pantaleoni treated private output as being generated within a market bazaar and political output as being generated within a political bazaar. In market environments people face options, pay prices, and make choices. They bear the value consequences of their action and live with the consequences of their choices. In non-market environments, people don't truly make choices in the standard sense of the term. Yet there was rationality in the actions people undertook, as there always is. That rationality in this setting resides in sentiments that people hold in conjunction with the ability of candidates to construct ideological images that resonate with those sentiments. Political competition was a process through which candidates competed for positions of rulership by trying to craft ideological images that would appeal to voter sentiments. To get along in the social environments in which they live, moreover, voters need to give logical-sounding reasons for their actions. That action, however, is not of the logical cause-effect form but rather is of the non-logical desirerationalization form.
In a related vein, there is a similarity to two distinct approaches to affirming the existence of God. The common approach follows the form of logical action by seeking to use logic to demonstrate why someone should choose to believe in the existence of God. One instance of this approach is Pascal's wager, based on the infinitely large value of a very small sum at any instant becoming infinitely large over an indefinitely long period of time. Another instance recurs to temporal notions of causation that culminates in the notion of a first cause, even with a notion of a Big Bang being such a possible first cause. The alternative approach to the existence of God has the same form as Pareto's notion of non-logical action, and is illustrated by Karl Barth's (1960 Barth's ( [1931 ) treatment of Anselm's formulation of "faith seeking understanding" [Fides Quaerens Intellectum] . In this approach, belief in God is a point of departure and not a conclusion, and the challenge is to grow in understanding what this profession entails.
Pareto's formulation of non-logical action pertains to such environments, and sets in motion tectonic clashing that is generated through interactions between the two environments. Pareto had and still has much insight awaiting incorporation into Virginia political economy, as Backhaus (1978) once set forth and as Patrick and Wagner (2015) explain in their treatment of some of Pareto's contributions to entangled political economy.
A Concluding Comment
Arthur Lovejoy stood against the main current of his and still our time in its seeking to reduce the ecology of human thought to a few stylized schools of thought.
There are purposes for which such reduction is useful because our brains can handle only so much information. Reduction of a number of nuanced formulations to a single, generic formulation might be useful for people who want to know a little but not a lot about that generic formulation, perhaps because they don't plan to work with those The latter type calls into play an affinity for classical political economy and Italian public finance and could be described as reflecting a Knightian motif with respect to its underlying pre-analytical cognitive vision when that program is projected backward.
Where that program might head in the coming years will be an emergent feature of the processes of scholarly competition, about which today we can offer speculation and conjecture but not knowledge, recalling, however, a Frank Knight statement to the effect that the primary problems of human living together in closed geographical proximity
results not from what we don't know but from what we know that is not true. Pareto 
